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How Capitalism Endogenously Creates Rising Income Inequality and Economic Crisis:  
The Macro Political Economy Model of Early Industrial Relations 
 
 
 “The forces of equilibrium are real, but they are only half the story. There are also forces making for 
breakdown. And intellectual interest in or emotional enthusiasm for the smooth-running features of 
competitive capitalism should not blind us to the other side of the story.” Paul Douglas (1935a:85). 
 
“Given a political system that is so sensitive to moneyed interests, growing economic inequality leads to a 
growing imbalance of political power, a vicious nexus between politics and economics.” Joseph Stiglitz 
(2012: xx). 
 
 
Introduction 
  The two epigraphs come from books separated by nearly eighty years, Controlling Depressions by Paul 
Douglas (1935) and The Price of Inequality by Joseph Stiglitz (2012).  Although one author is a labor 
economist and professor of industrial relations (his position title at Chicago) and writes about the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and the other is a Nobel laureate economic theorist and writes about the World 
Economic Crisis of 2008-2009, their respective messages are connected parts of an institutionalist theory 
of endogenous income inequality and macroeconomic crisis.  
Both men argue that a free-market economy, through a nexus of interacting economic and political forces, 
internally generates rising income and wealth inequality, aggregate demand/supply imbalance, and risk of 
economic and financial collapse. Stiglitz cites, for example, “adverse dynamics” and “vicious circles” (p. 
82) and says, “unbalanced politics driven by extremes of inequality leads to instability” (p. 89). Similarly, 
Douglas says, “There are present in our economic system latent tendencies which may, and more or less 
periodically do, result in a cumulative disequilibrium” (p. 85). To combat this destabilizing dynamic, both 
economists advocate an agenda of institutional and policy reforms that redistribute economic and political 
power to labor and the lower-middle classes, including initiatives that strengthen labor laws, collective 
bargaining, social safety net programs, education and training opportunities, and full-employment 
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fiscal/monetary policies. Douglas and Stiglitz are both aware their diagnoses and solutions are likely to 
get a failing grade when viewed through the lens of orthodox theory but to them the theory is a “romantic 
daydream” (Douglas, p. 249) and “pleasant fantasy” (Stiglitz, p. 116).  
Papers with an explicit macroeconomics focus are unusual in an industrial relations (IR) journal. 
However, few labor-related topics today figure as prominently in academic research and political/policy 
debates as the causes of macro-level wage stagnation, rising income inequality, and anemic employment 
and GDP growth (Freeman 2007; Palley 2012; Wisman 2013; Piketty 2013). These trends, for example, 
were at center stage in the 2016 Presidential election, particularly as the political parties responded to 
growing middle-class anger and frustration at the disappearance of rising living standards and secure 
well-paying jobs, and brought out a stream of conflicting diagnoses and solutions from right- and left-
oriented think tanks (e.g., Sherk 2013; Bivens and Mishel 2015). These trends have also been identified 
as causal factors in the labor market collapse of the Great Depression of the 1930s and near-collapse in 
World Financial Crisis of 2008-2009. Also germane for an industrial relations audience is the little-known 
fact that the macroeconomic connection between wages, inequality, and economic cycles and crises was 
the leading research topic in the early American IR field from its founding in 1918-1920 through the first 
phase of the New Deal in the mid-1930s. In this area the three most important American contributors 
were institutional labor economists John Commons, Paul Douglas, and Sumner Slichter, while in Britain 
the major contributors were Sidney and Beatrice Webb, John Hobson, G.D.H. Cole, and William 
Beveridge. Although some second-order differences separate their respective models and policy 
recommendations (the British were more left-radical than the Americans), as a group these IR pioneers 
carved out a distinctive theoretical and policy program broadly in the middle between the neoclassical 
free-market and laissez-faire right and Marxian socialist and central planning left.  
Given the current-day importance of the income inequality topic, and plethora of competing and 
sometimes incommensurate explanations, this paper makes a contribution by going back to the 
institutional economics/industrial relations (IEIR) literature of the 1920s-1930s, with primary focus on the 
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American team of Commons, Douglas, and Slichter (CDS), and analytically represents their theory of 
endogenous wage stagnation, rising income inequality, and macroeconomic crisis. Three research 
questions are the center of analysis: (1) does a neoliberal, free market economy have a built-in propensity 
to generate a secular increase in income inequality and, if so, how and why?, (2) if it does, can an 
economy maintain long-run macroeconomic demand/supply (DS) balance and full-employment GDP 
growth as real wages stagnate and labor’s income share declines?, and (3) similarly, what role do IR 
institutions and policies play in the inequality-crisis scenario and, in particular, how can they reduce or 
prevent the trend toward inequality and stagnation/crisis? The answers to these questions, which boil 
down to Yes, No, and Share Productivity Gains with Labor, are worked out by formalizing into diagrams 
the key ideas of this early IEIR literature.  
The only analytical requirement for readers is familiarity with aggregate demand/aggregate supply 
(AD/AS) analysis from basic economics (e.g., Krugman and Wells 2015) and patience to work through 
two diagrams with numerous letters and arrows. The paper develops the theory ideas from early IR 
largely in the historical context of the 1920s-1930s but at the end applies the insights and policy 
recommendations to today’s economy. Although the analysis is largely developed with reference to the 
American situation, where the economy is relatively free market/neoliberal and inequality trends are 
likewise most pronounced, a number of other countries have rising income inequality for which these 
ideas also have application (Berlingieri, Blanchenay, and Criscuolo 2017).    
Overview: Empirical Inequality Trends and Competing Theoretical Perspectives  
  Before getting into the specifics of IEIR theory it is helpful to put the central research questions into an 
empirical and theoretical context.  
Figure 1 shows the growth in net productivity (output per employee hour net of depreciation) and mean 
and median real hourly compensation (wages and benefits) for private sector non-supervisory employees 
in the U.S. from 1973 to 2014 (Bivens and Mishel 2015). In the preceding period of 1947 to 1973, real 
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compensation grew modestly faster than productivity (2.7% vs. 2.1%) but then between 1973 and 2014 
the relationship reversed (1.0% vs. 1.7%). More eye-catching, after 1973 mean real compensation grew 
42.5% but median real compensation by only 8.7%, indicating that most of the compensation growth was 
for a small group of very high earners (substantially pulling up the mean). Thus, from 1947 to 1973 all the 
productivity gains generated by economy were passed into higher real wages; after 1973 only 15% was 
passed on, mostly bunched in the late 1990s when the economy was near full employment. If the years 
1995-2000 are taken out, real median compensation from 1973 to 2014 was essentially flat (↑ 2.6%). 
When the data are disaggregated by industry, the decoupling between productivity growth and real wage 
growth is most stark in the manufacturing sector.  Diagrammatically, the result is emergence and growth 
of a productivity-wage cone. 
Countries such as Australia, Britain, Canada and Germany have also had a decoupling of productivity and 
real wage growth although the cone is more recent and smaller. Trends within and across countries are 
also noticeably affected by choice of productivity, compensation, and price measures (Freeman 2007). 
Figure 2 shows the share of pre-tax national income going to the top 1% of households from the mid-
1910s to 2010 in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and United States (Osberg 2014). Income inequality 
increased in the U.S. over the early 20th century, peaked in 1928 just before the onset of the Great 
Depression, and after World War II fell to much lower levels until the late 1970s. Then, timed with the 
Reagan-Thatcher shift to free market neoliberalism, inequality began an upward climb that continues to 
the present time and reached the 1920s peak in the early 2010s. Similar trends occur in the other three 
countries, although less accentuated and with somewhat different-timed peaks. Although not shown in 
Figure 2, rising income inequality in the US has also been accompanied by rising wealth inequality, 
leading to these types of disparities: in 2013, the top 1% of households had average income of $1,679,00 
and average net worth of $18,623,000; the top 20% had $257,200 and $2,260,300, respectively; while the 
bottom 40% had $20,300 and -$10,300 (Domhoff 2017: Table 1).  
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[Insert Figures 1 & 2 Here] 
Clearly there are winners and losers from these trends. For example, had the 1948-1972 pattern of income 
inequality and labor force participation continued through 1973-2013, the median household would have 
received 18 percent ($9000) more income (Council of Economic Advisors 2015: 33). In terms of the 
overall performance of the economy, however, does a different split of the pie effect the size of the pie? 
The answer is: it depends.  
When looking at the trends in Figures 1 and 2, care must be taken to distinguish between cause and effect. 
That is, are the trends in wage stagnation and rising inequality causes of unbalanced growth and eventual 
crisis or are they the induced effects (Slichter 1936: 200). Also, the answer depends on which school of 
economics is consulted (Murphy and Topel 2016; Palley 2016). Illustratively, Stiglitz (2012: 243) asserts, 
“the standard macroeconomic models don’t even recognize that the distribution of income matters” and 
Douglas (1935b: 107) observes, “The economists of the so-called ‘orthodox’ school have tended to 
content themselves with Say’s dictum …. [and] therefore looked with more or less contempt upon the 
theory that depressions are caused by the masses not possessing sufficient purchasing power.”  
Rephrased, Douglas and Stiglitz are saying that in conventional economics ‘distribution doesn’t matter’ 
for explaining aggregate DS equilibrium and boom-bust cycles. As examples, Christina Romer (2013), 
former chair of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, in a paper “Lessons of the Great 
Depression for Policy Today” does not mention the wage-productivity nexus or rising income inequality, 
nor are these topics mentioned by Janet Yellen, chair of the Federal Reserve Bank, in an assessment of the 
2016 growth outlook for the American economy (Yellen 2016). Similarly, Nobel-laureate Edward 
Prescott (1999), in an article “Some Observations on the Great Depression,” argues (p. 28), “The 
capitalistic economy is stable, and absent some change in technology or the rules of the economic game, 
the economy converges to a constant growth path with the standard of living doubling every forty years.” 
He concludes (p. 26) that the cause of the Great Depression was not too much income inequality but 
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wrongheaded government policies, such as programs by Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt to stimulate 
demand by maintaining/raising wage rates. Actually, in neoclassical growth models lower wages and 
higher income inequality are pro-growth because they promote larger saving-investment and faster 
increase in the amount of capital (K) for input in the nation’s production function.   
Mainstream economists tend to steer clear of the income inequality → demand failure → crisis topic 
because the theory is regarded as unacceptably heterodox with political-ideological implications too 
critical/left. Prescott (1999:30), for example, refers to this research stream as “the Marxian view;” former 
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (2012:6) remarks, “I used to be called a class warrior for even raising the 
subject of widening inequality,’ while Chicago Nobelist Robert Lucas (2004: 7) dismisses the topic with 
the observation, “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, …. in my opinion the most 
poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.” The mainstream’s acceptable outer boundary on the 
inequality topic is illustrated by Jason Furman, chair of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors. 
Following Stiglitz, he argues that “the assumption of a perfectly competitive marketplace is often 
misguided” (Furman and Orszag 2015: 1), highlights growing firm-level monopoly power, declining 
labor mobility, and growing inequality in the division of rents as causes of the inequality trend, but does 
not take the last and biggest step and causally link inequality to macroeconomic (mal)performance.  
The neoclassical second welfare theorem and Say’s Law doctrine in macroeconomics give theoretical 
justification to the mainstream’s ‘distribution doesn’t matter’ position. The second welfare theorem states 
that in a perfectly competitive economy the attainment of efficiency is independent of the distribution of 
endowments and income (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). Say’s Law states that in a competitive 
market economy it is logically impossible to have a general condition of overproduction (a supply glut), 
and its converse of demand deficiency, because prices for commodities and factor inputs fall until all 
markets clear and AD = AS (Keynes 1936; Davidson 2007; Lavoie 2014). The implication of these two 
propositions is that the empirical trends in wage stagnation and income inequality in Figures 1 and 2 are 
irrelevant to attainment of full-employment GDP. Thus, if the top decile of households gets most of the 
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income then the economy produces more Mercedes, cosmetic surgery, private schooling, and 
capital/investment goods (because the rich save more → lower interest rates → larger share 
Investment/GDP) but if the bottom decile gets more of the income then the economy produces more 
Chevrolets, hot dogs, vinyl handbags, and fewer capital goods. Thus, income distribution affects the 
composition of GDP, represented by alternative points on the production possibility frontier, but not the 
economy’s automatic price-driven gravitation to it.   
A long line of non-orthodox economists claim, on the other hand, that ‘distribution matters’ for aggregate 
DS balance (Bleaney 1976; Devine 1983; Brown 2005; Wisman 2013; Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). 
Commons (1934a: 348-66, 876-877; 1934b: 60) claims that all schools of modern economics are rooted 
in Adam Smith but then split into orthodox and heterodox branches in the late 1810s based on the dispute 
between Ricardo and Malthus over method (abstract vs. realist), theorizing the human agent (strong 
rationality/individualist vs. limited rationality/social), and validity of Say’s Law and invisible-hand 
equilibrium process. Orthodox economics follows in the tradition of Ricardo and original institutional 
economics and Keynesian economics follow in the tradition of Malthus, and his contemporary Sismondi. 
(Marx takes a conflicted position, denigrating Malthus but following him on Say’s Law). Both Commons 
and Keynes reject the Say’s Law and invisible hand doctrines and therefore fall in the Malthus-Sismondi 
line (Atkinson and Oleson 1998; Kaufman 2012), which Keynes (1936: 340) refers to as the “brave army 
of heretics.” On this matter, Douglas (1935b: 117) observes,  
And, since the ‘orthodox’ have dominated the schools, the result has been that the doctrines of 
Owen, Malthus, Sismondi, Marx, Rodbertus, Hobson, and C.H. Douglas have been relatively 
ignored by those who regard themselves as the economic literate. Instead the orthodox have 
emphasized the theory that there is an almost precise balancing between the forces of production 
and consumption, and by reiterating the theory of equilibrium have ignored the fact of 
breakdowns. 
Regarding the self-correcting property of markets, and the operation of a presumed invisible hand, IEIR 
economists are unanimous in rejecting these ideas. Commons states, for example, “There is no invisible 
hand about it, no natural equilibrium of forces of nature that augments the national wealth by mere 
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unguided self-interest” (1923: 116-17) and “Modern capitalistic industry has proved that there is universal 
overproduction and unemployment… This was impossible under the older molecular theories of demand 
and supply” (1934a: 892). Similarly, the Webbs (1923: 142) claim, “There is no such ‘invisible hand’ as 
Adam Smith romantically suggested” and John Dunlop (1944:228) asserts in his first book, “The 
automatic pricing mechanism as model or institution in the labor market is dead.” The ‘no invisible hand’ 
thesis is also the central proposition in Keynes’ General Theory (Davidson 2007; Kaufman 2012) and 
Stiglitz follows Keynes in declaring, “There is no invisible hand” (The Guardian, December 20, 2002). 
The ‘no invisible hand’ proposition means IEIR, (original) Keynes, and post-Keynesians – recently 
synthesized into a macro school of thought called ‘Post-Keynesian Institutionalism’ (Whalen 2008)  --  
are doubly heterodox for they deny not only the second welfare theorem but also the first welfare 
theorem, stating that a competitive market system yields Pareto efficient outcomes (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green 1995). This dissenter’s position naturally leads IEIR and fellow economists to also 
deny the theorem’s central policy implication, which is laissez-faire and non-intervention (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green 1995: 524). For example, Slichter (1934) argues, “Since ordinary market processes 
do not produce the adjustments needed to stabilize production and employment,…this means that the 
government…needs to assume the new function of economic manager” (p. 213). Government, therefore, 
has the task of acting as the coordinating visible hand of the economy, exerting social control at strategic 
places to obtain what Commons (1934a: 120) calls a ‘managed equilibrium’ with ‘reasonable values’ (pp. 
682-83).  
The IEIR position is that a free-market capitalist system typically operates inside the economy’s 
production possibility frontier and is prone to large and disruptive expansions and contractions with threat 
of periodic depression and breakdown. One of the contributing factors to the instability and breakdown of 
the system is an endogenous propensity toward failure of wages to rise in line with productivity, leading 
to increasing income inequality and DS imbalance. Douglas (1935b: 117) concludes, for example, 
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the chain of reasoning would therefore seem to be fairly clear, that a failure on the part of the 
incomes of farmers, manual wage earners, and lower salaried workers to advance as rapidly as the 
volume of consumers’ goods many lead to very serious and progressively cumulative 
consequences.   
Although not a labor/IR economist per se, Harold Moulton was an institutional economist (Rutherford 
2011), director of the Brookings Institution, and co-author of a three-volume research study on causes of 
the depression. In a lengthy summary published in Fortune magazine titled “The Trouble with Capitalism 
is the Capitalists,” Moulton (1935) relates that the industrial sector of the relatively prosperous 1920s 
operated approximately 20% inside the economy’s production possibility frontier and the gap was 
increasing because mal-distribution was funneling excessive saving-investment into capacity expansion 
while working class wage income and consumption spending were stagnating. He concludes,  
Our capacity to produce consumer goods has been chronically in excess of the amount which 
consumers are able to take off the markets; and this situation is attributable to the increasing 
proportion of the total income which is diverted into savings channels. The result is a chronic 
inability to find market outlets adequate to absorb our full productive capacity.  
His conclusion is that what economic theory teaches should happen is that competition forces firms to 
pass on productivity gains by lowering prices and raising money wages but what actually happened in the 
1920s is closer to the reverse – the large industrial/banking network of corporations maintained/raised 
prices to consumers but maintained/cut hourly earnings to workers (e.g., by less overtime and raising the 
target on piece rates). Orthodox economists then and now (e.g., Robbins 1934; Rothbard 2000; Cole and 
Ohanian 2004) place blame for the depression on workers who over-price their labor and then refuse to 
cut the price to buy back their jobs. The title Moulton gives his article, therefore, correctly from an IEIR 
perspective shifts the blame to employers for doing the opposite of what the invisible hand directs.    
President Franklin Roosevelt and Senator Richard Wagner also believed that growing mal-distribution 
was a major cause of the depression (Keyserling 1945; Perkins 1946; Rosenof 1975; Mitchell 1984; 
Kaufman 1996, 2012). Roosevelt said in a 1932 campaign speech (quoted in Fusfeld 1956, p. 205): 
Our basic problem is not an insufficiency of capital. It is an insufficient distribution of buying 
power coupled with an oversufficient speculation in production. While wages rose in many of our 
industries, they did not rise proportionately to the reward to capital, and at the same time the 
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purchasing power of other great groups of our population was permitted to shrink [a reference to 
shrinking farm incomes]. 
Roosevelt’s position was shared by Senator Wagner, principal legislative architect of much of the New 
Deal recovery program and author of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, 1935). Wagner, like 
Roosevelt, believed that both the rise in income inequality and collapse into depression required 
fundamental structural reforms and redistribution of economic and political power from the moneyed 
interests to the ‘forgotten man’ so an economic recovery is anchored on long-term shared prosperity and 
not temporary monetary or fiscal stimulus – a challenge to the money-power status quo that earned both 
men much hatred and condemnation as socialists-communists (Perkins 1946; Stabile 2016). Their 
recovery-through-structural reform and power-balancing strategy is clearly stated in the preamble of the 
NLRA:  
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of 
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or 
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and 
tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing 
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates 
and working conditions within and between industries. 
Viewed through the lens of the neoclassical/mainstream economic theory taught in universities then and 
now, this statement is a classic example of how bad theory leads to bad policy. Perhaps for this reason, 
and also ascendancy of Chicago-free market-neoliberal economic doctrine post-1980, the IEIR 
explanation of the Great Depression has almost completely disappeared from research and textbook 
literatures -- even though it formed the intellectual heart of the New Deal transformation of the 1930s and, 
in combination with Keynes’ economics, provided for several decades after the war the guiding 
economic-social philosophy of one of America’s two political parties. Since universities and their 
faculties are charged with fairly and dis-interestedly examining alternative and perhaps politically 
contentious science-based explanations of events, a reconsideration and elaboration of the IEIR theory of 
unbalanced institutional structure → growing income inequality → worsening demand/supply imbalance 
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→ rising probability of financial/economic crisis (all ceteris paribus) seems a deserving and overdue 
project.  
IEIR Model Developed: The Political Economy Dimension 
  The IEIR model is depicted in Figure 3 (next section). It has three parts: aggregate product market, 
aggregate labor market, and a roof over them representing the national government. The roof (Kaufman 
2010a) incorporates the political economy dimension of IEIR and its two-way connection to the market 
system, symbolized by the up and down arrows.    
For clarity of ideas, it is important to note that the IEIR model is a close complement but not member per 
se of what are traditionally considered under-consumption theories of economic crises (Bleaney 1976; 
Allgoewer 2002). This theory strand was, however, also influential in the early New Deal, such as from  
Hobson and Foster and Catchings (Barber 1985). The under-consumption view draws a direct causal line 
from a large profit/small labor share to an economic crisis precipitated by over-investment and under-
consumption. CDS explicitly reject this direct line of causation from income shares to insufficient 
demand (e.g., Commons 1934a: 579-81). Instead, the larger boom/bust pattern is driven by medium-long-
term swings in Schumpeterian innovation and capital spending, endogenous credit expansion and 
contraction, and rise and fall of expected margins of profit, with failure of real wages to grow in line with 
productivity serving as a reinforcing maladjustment that leads over time to worsening deficient 
demand/excess supply imbalance. The IEIR theory, therefore, focuses more on Figure 1 than Figure 2 as 
the important link between inequality and crisis.  
The Political-Economic Nexus 
  The start point for (original) institutional economics is that the economy is a structured set of market and 
non-market institutions, called an economic order, and it is not demand/supply that determines outcomes 
and behaviors but the nature of the economic order within which market and non-market institutions and 
their functional relations are embedded (Hamilton 1919; Samuels and Schmid 1981; Brown 2005; 
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Kaufman 2017). While portions of the economic order spontaneously emerge and evolve, ultimately a 
nation’s economy is shaped by government-established property rights, human rights, resource 
endowments, legal rules of the economic game, and electoral procedures. To highlight this political 
economy dimension, Commons titled his last book Economics of Collective Action (1950) and an earlier 
book on alternative employment systems Industrial Government (1921b). Also, Dunlop in Industrial 
Relations Systems (1958) makes the web of rules that structures the employment system the field’s central 
theoretical focus; and Clark (1926) and Slichter (1931) frame economic outcomes as the product of social 
control. Thus, an IEIR model begins with the nexus between state political power, economic organization, 
and economic outcomes. This idea is shown in Figure 3 by the governance roof drawn over the product 
market in panel (a) and labor market in panel (b). The Federal Reserve Bank is highlighted immediately 
under the roof because of its important role.   
Accordingly, mainstream economists beg the question when they start textbooks and research papers with 
“assume a competitive market” and draw DS curves in the middle of the diagram because the appropriate 
model depends on the specification of the institutional order. The institutional order, in turn, depends on 
the people and groups who control the nation’s governance system and how they shape it to serve their 
individual and collective interests. If having a competitive free-market system does not suit their interests, 
or is not organizationally or technologically feasible, then a competitive free-market system will not exist 
and it seems a scientifically crude, heroic, or normatively-driven method to assume it anyway. As a 
concrete example, Cole and Ohanian (2004) create a competitive-based, constant-returns-to-scale 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the 1930s economy, fit it with data, and find that the 
New Deal worsened the depression. But, the conclusion is foreordained by the model’s built-in 
assumptions, which as an empirical matter might reasonably represent the farm sector but definitely not 
the industrial sector.  
The IEIR economists’ view (also, Stiglitz 2012: Ch. 2) is that the canon of self-interest predicts that 
capitalists, located at the top of the economic pyramid, seek to extract large rents from the rest of society 
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by gaining an institutional order of one-sided competition. An example is maximum competition and open 
markets on the input and cost side and restricted competition and sheltered markets on the output and 
sales side (Clark 1926; Slichter 1931). This idea may seem tainted with left-wing radicalism but, in fact, it 
is Adam Smith (1937/1776: 250) who observes, “to widen the market and narrow the competition is 
always the interest of the dealers.” From an IEIR perspective, an exemplar of how politics is used to tip 
the competitive playing field in favor of the capital-owning class is the combination of high tariffs in 
product markets and, until 1924, open immigration in labor markets (P↑ and W↓).  
Marx (1867) assumes the government is the agent of the ruling class and creates the institutional order to 
promote maximum capital accumulation and profit-making by facilitating monopolization of product 
markets, cutthroat competition in labor markets, and imperialist control of foreign markets. The early 
IEIR writers partially agreed with Marx. From their viewpoint, it was indisputable that the industrial-
financial-propertied class dominated the governments of that era and the government, in turn, organized 
and ran the economy to disproportionately serve their interests. Douglas (1933) states, for example, with 
direct reference to the Marxian thesis, 
Instead of the supposedly neutral state of liberal tradition, it is claimed that we have in reality a 
class state which reflects the interests of the most powerful classes…The scales are therefore 
claimed to be weighted against the lower economic groups…That there is much truth in this 
indictment must be admitted and it constitutes perhaps the most fundamental challenge which the 
modern state must meet.    
Although in Institutional Economics (1934a) Commons frames himself as “the Last Mohican of 
Liberalism” (p. 902), he nonetheless thought, as did Adam Smith before him (stating on p. 438 of Wealth 
of Nations that the “master manufacturers…. have become formidable to the government, and upon many 
occasions intimidate the legislature”), that government is dominated by bankers and industrialists. He 
states, with an obvious parallel to the financial crisis of 2008-2009, “This is American capitalism. It is an 
economic government of bankers more powerful than the political government” (p. 895). Stiglitz (2012: 
30-31) echoes Commons’ observation, stating:  
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Our political system has increasingly been working in ways that increase the inequality of 
outcomes and reduce equality of opportunity. This should come as no surprise: we have a 
political system that gives inordinate power to those at the top and they have used their power not 
only to limit the extent of redistribution but also to shape the rules of the game in their favor. 
A significant part of the IR tradition, therefore, is recognition by the field’s pioneers that achieving 
balance and justice in employment relations first requires achieving reform in political relations so the 
institutional order can be appropriately structured to yield the desired outcomes in external and internal 
labor markets. Therefore, the first reform effort Commons engaged in at Wisconsin (1904-1905) was 
drafting the nation’s first state civil service system so appointment and promotion in government jobs are 
on merit and not political patronage. Similarly, to give workers greater political voice, Commons (1907) 
and Douglas (1923) advocated shifting election of legislators from single winner to proportional 
representation. Douglas (1935a) also favored forming a new progressive party to the left of the 
Democratic party while the Webbs and Hobson in the UK helped form the Labour Party. Everyone in 
American IR thought the country needed a stronger labor movement in order to represent workers’ 
interests in the polity and serve as a counterweight to business influence throughout government.  
The IEIR form of polity, therefore, is a balanced pluralist network of competing interest groups. The 
central questions the polity has to answer are: what are reasonable economic outcomes for society? and 
what are the realistic alternatives for accomplishing this outcome? (Commons 1934a: Ch. 10). 
Reasonable economic alternatives and outcomes will not emerge if only one social group, be it business, 
organized labor, or the military, holds the power since they will structure the rules of the game and 
resource endowments to promote their partisan interests over others. The IEIR solution is a democratic 
stakeholder form of representation where all affected parties have influence and voice.  
Commons generalized the concept of collective bargaining to cover all such stakeholder forms of 
governance, including employer-created representation plans, tripartite representation on industrial 
commissions and minimum wage boards, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Fed). For example, if the Fed is controlled by bankers, a zero inflation monetary target promotes their 
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interests but, if workers control the Fed, their interests are better served by a full-employment monetary 
target. A reasonable outcome gives weight to both interests. In turn, if over a forty-year period real wages 
(one set of social interests) stagnate while stock prices and profits (a different set of social interests) 
boom, certainly a plausible part of the explanation may involve mainstream demand/supply shifts, such as 
skill-biased technological change and globalization of product and labor markets, but these factors are 
unlikely to have had such a large and long-term impact without also being accompanied and facilitated by 
a politically-engineered twist in the underlying rules of the game. Relevant examples include large cuts in 
marginal income and capital gains tax rates, various forms of corporate subsidy/welfare, encouragement 
of shareholder interests and executive compensation over stakeholder interests and mutual-gain 
compensation, and weakening of labor and environmental regulatory agencies/policies, which have the 
effect of shifting costs and responsibilities away from, and funneling national income and privileges 
toward, the nation’s corporations and their owners-executives (Hacker and Pierson 2010).  
Another form of twist that facilitates and reinforces the ability of corporations and other high-end interest 
groups to capture additional rents by politically reengineering the rules of the game is theoretical-
ideological in nature and comes from academic economics. One notes, for example, that many 
mainstream labor economists (e.g., Boeri and Van Ours 2008; Neumark and Wascher 2008) omit mention 
of political rent-seeking by business actors and wealthy elites at the top of the economic order (e.g., fast-
food corporations and their industry associations, lobbyists, and large campaign contributions) and, 
instead, focus their critique on rent-seeking activities by workers at the low end of the order (e.g., the 
people working at fast-food restaurants). These workers, however, typically have only perishable and 
often over-supplied labor services to rent and therefore look to unions, labor law, and social safety net 
programs for collective support and advancement of their interests. This blind spot-normative bias in 
standard economics in favor of the interests of capital owners (physical, financial, human, social) over 
labor owners is further exacerbated by various ‘do as I say and not as I do’ double standards. A close-to-
home example is when academic economists in their research and teaching preach the efficiency gospel 
17 
 
of competitive labor markets – and pound the lectern against the distortionary, rent-seeking evils of 
market institutions (e.g., minimum wage laws, job security protections) – but then noticeably fail to apply 
this same reasoning and critique to their own university employment systems that provide tenured 
professors with enviable rents from a package of high pay, generous benefits, flexible hours, interesting 
work, and secure life-time jobs. These examples, and numerous others (e.g., modeling labor as if a 
commodity input valued only to the extent it produces a profit and satisfies someone’s consumption 
experience), pointedly suggest that the scientific contest over alternative models of the economy, 
conflicting interpretations of the Great Depression, and assessed pros and cons of invisible-hand laissez-
faire vs. socially-controlled institutional intervention, is not in fact an objective/value-free search for truth 
(the one-sided mainstream self-image) but, rather, an exercise normatively skewed to favor and promote  
what Freeman (2005) calls the ‘competitive ideal.’ e 
The State and the Market System: Model Developed 
  The connection between the state in the roof and market system below the roof in Figure 3 is now 
developed in more detail. The discussion is framed in the context of the 1920s-1930s. At first glance the 
diagrams feature a perhaps daunting number of bolded points and letters but they are explained in a step-
by-step process, considerably aid clear exposition of cause-effect linkages, and are elementary 
applications of economic principles.   
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The political-economic nexus between inequality and crisis starts first in the labor market in panel (b). 
Different labor supply curves are shown, drawn as a function of the real wage W/P. For the moment, 
focus on the horizontal bottom pair. With one set of laws in the institutional order, the labor supply curve 
is the higher solid line and with another it is the lower dashed line (Kaufman 2010b). The position of the 
labor supply curve is set by workers’ reservations wages which adaptively adjust upward when workers 
face less financial pressure to accept a low wage offer, and vice versa (per standard search models). 
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Accordingly, a free market labor law regime, such as employment-at-will, no unions, and no social safety 
net, exposes workers to more unemployment risk with fewer back-up resources and thus results in a 
(ceteris paribus) lower labor supply curve. By reverse reasoning, the labor supply curve is positioned 
higher in a welfare state regime.  An IEIR insight is that whether wages are high or low, including the 
compensating differentials theorized to protect the workers’ interests in safe and healthful work 
conditions, are in part a product of social choice – hidden in orthodox economics by leaving out the 
governance roof, most likely tipped against the weaker party (labor) and biased toward the status quo by 
the Pareto welfare criterion.  
A linked IEIR insight is that the capitalist employment relationship creates a structural inequality of 
bargaining power in both external and internal labor markets which favors the interests of employers over 
workers. The origin of the inequality is when the employer and job applicant sit down to negotiate terms 
and conditions, the worker typically needs the job more than the company needs the applicant, causing the 
worker to agree to lower and more ‘take it or leave it’ terms than otherwise. Neoclassical labor 
economists of the last thirty years studiously avoid touching this idea, akin to a radical hot potato, but it 
has respectable and common-sense origins, per Adam Smith’s observation, “the masters can hold out 
much longer… and force the other [workers] into a compliance with their terms” (Smith 1776/1937: 66). 
Besides having fewer financial reserves to hold-out and a perishable labor service to sell, the worker’s 
bargaining position is often undercut because a reserve of unemployed people in the market gives the 
company many willing substitutes. The effect of this inequality is to also lower the workers’ reservation 
wage and supply curve.   
The more severe is this inequality, such as for low-skill workers in an oversupplied labor market, the 
lower and more tipped are wages, compensating differentials, and labor conditions. An IEIR insight is 
that government influences the breadth/depth of unequal bargaining power by labor law regimes that shift 
up or down the aggregate labor supply curve. Also, capitalists, workers, and consumer-public have 
different interests in the government’s decision and therefore jockey through the political process to get 
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their favored outcome. Accordingly, labor market outcomes are a two-fold product of employer-employee 
bargaining position within the market (panels a and b) and within the polity (the roof).   
Government, business, and social institutions, as examined in sociology and political science, introduce 
yet further structure and inequality into product and labor markets (Sørenson 1995; Jackson and 
Muellenborn 2012). The two most important sources of structure for this discussion are dualism in 
product and labor market structures and parallel dualism in receipt of economic rents (aka surplus). 
Orthodox theory, such as in popular labor economics texts, takes the competitive model as the default in 
labor and product markets and monopsony-monopoly as a special case. IEIR, on the other hand, takes 
imperfect competition as the norm with numerous forms and elements of monopoly and monopsony.  
Monopsony in IEIR (Lester 1964; Kaufman 2010b) is broadly defined to include all sources of labor 
immobility and employer wage-making ability, such as specific human capital, company benefit 
programs, small number of competing employers, and positive job separation costs. These mobility 
constraints may result in various forms of labor exploitation, such as below-standard wages and benefits, 
salary compression for long-tenure employees, and segmented/discriminatory job and wage classification 
systems. However, in IEIR some aspects of monopoly and monsopsony are efficiency and welfare 
enhancing. Following Schumpeter (1939), for example, an element of monopoly gives firms the profit 
and market stability needed for innovation and long-term investment projects while a degree of 
monopsony goes with primary/high-road employment systems and high-performance human resource 
management practices, although frequently in the context of two-sided bilateral monopoly (Molloy and 
Barney 2015; Kaufman 2015).    
A useful abstraction in this context is a dual market model, such as oligopoly-core vs. competitive-
periphery in the product market (Commons 1934a: 885-86; Lee and Samuels 1992) and bilateral 
monopoly-primary-internal vs. competitive-secondary-external in the labor market (Kerr 1977; Doeringer 
and Piore 1971). The dualism in labor markets is illustrated in panel (b) by, respectively, the horizontal 
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and forward-sloped labor supply curves (focus on the solid lines for now). The perfectly elastic supply 
curve LSC1 (C= competitive-external), up to the kink point (full utilization), shows that common labor is 
readily available to secondary-competitive firms at a going wage of WC1. The wage WC1 is relatively low; 
also, this labor is used in externalized employment systems in jobs requiring generic and quickly learned 
procedures and managed through hire-fire practices. The inelastic supply curve LSM1 (M= monopsony-
internal) starts at a higher wage intercept since these workers embody education and skills from human 
capital investment, often with a substantial component acquired from firm-specific training and 
experience in internal labor markets. It slopes upward because these workers have unique productivity-
related characteristics, such as intelligence/ability, quantity/quality of human capital and experience, and 
motivation/personality, which are unequally distributed and therefore give some labor suppliers market 
leverage to command a higher wage. Indeed, characteristics for certain primary jobs, such as corporate 
executive, computer scientist and rock star, are very scarce and give LSM a steep nonlinear segment. 
At a point in time, such as 1922 with aggregate labor demand curve LD22 (IEIR opinion was split on 
whether the neoclassical marginal product schedule is also the labor demand curve; this issue is noted but 
not further examined), secondary labor (e.g., in textile mills and lumber camps of the early 20s) gets the 
low(er) wage WC1 (point M) while primary labor (in the welfare capitalist firms) gets the high(er) wage 
WM1 (point N). As the economy grows, labor demand curves in both sectors (assumed identical and 
portrayed in a single market diagram for simplicity) shift rightward, such as from LD22 to LD29 in panel 
(b). The wage for secondary labor remains the same at WC1 (point U) while the wage for primary labor 
rises to WM2 (point T). If it is reasonably assumed primary workers save more than secondary workers, 
wealth inequality also grows – strongly if saving is near zero for secondary workers. Also, the earnings of 
primary workers contain economic rent of triangle WM1NX (wage above minimum supply price) while 
the earnings of secondary workers have zero rent (Commons 1893; Webb and Webb 1897; Hobson 1909; 
Kaufman 2013). Because rent is ‘income received but not earned’ (earned = required payment for 
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productive contribution), it may be removed, such as with a progressive income tax -- strongly pushed by 
all IEIR economists, along with an inheritance tax -- without harming allocative efficiency.  
Important to the story, as the economy grows not only does the distribution of income widen in favor of 
high earners but the rent component of their income also increases (Hobson 1909, 1923). Assume the 
labor demand curve shifts to LD29. Employment of competitive/external workers increases (point U) but 
the wage remains WC1 and none therefore receives rent. Employment of primary/internal workers expands 
to point T, the wage rises to WM2 (allowing for an element of monopsony deduction, or offset of 
monopsony by bilateral monopoly), all persons but the marginal last-hired receive a rent, and total rent 
expands to WM2TX. Although not directly shown in the diagram, rent increases dramatically for the small 
group located on the steep nonlinear segment of the supply curve (e.g., CEOs, Wall Street financiers). 
The implication is that economic growth, unless strong enough to soak up the reserve of unemployed and 
under-employed in the secondary sector (getting to the kink point on LSC1), leads to rising wages and 
greater surplus for the top part of the workforce but (mostly) stagnant wages and no surplus (or no 
increase in surplus) for the middle-lower part. Growth also leads to higher profit for firms (e.g., in the 
secondary sector, the profit triangle WC1ZM increases to WC1YU) and a tendency for the profit share of 
income to rise. The IEIR model predicts, therefore, a trend toward rising inequality in personal and 
functional income distributions and wealth distribution.  
The dual character of the product market – described by Douglas (1935a: 233) as “half monopolistic and 
half competitive” -- amplifies distributional inequality. The price received by competitive sector firms 
(given LAS22), such as P22C in the goods market in panel (a), just yields a normal profit in the long run 
and therefore is ‘no rent’ since price just covers average cost. Firms in the monopoly sector, protected by 
product differentiation or barriers to entry, charge a higher price, such as P22M, and earn economic profit 
and monopoly rent. This rent is either kept as retained earnings, usually for capital investment, or 
distributed to owners-shareholders as profits and interest. These owners-shareholders are concentrated in 
the top-end of the personal income distribution (the top 1% of U.S. households by income owned 50% of 
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all stocks and mutual funds in 2013; Domhoff 2017: Table 3), thus adding to inequality among 
households. 
The dual structure of the economy, used as a simplifying abstraction, is partly a function of exogenous 
variation in production systems and factor endowments. A primary sector forms around, for example, 
production processes with substantial increasing returns, fixed/overhead costs, and team 
interdependencies utilizing labor which requires substantial investment in organization-specific skills and 
procedures and long-term jobs to maximize discretionary effort and knowledge creation/sharing 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971). The dual structure is also created and strengthened, however, by self-
interested individuals and groups who use governments and social institutions (e.g., elite Ivy League 
universities in the U.S.; Oxbridge universities in the UK) to create and protect advantageous positions for 
positional goods (prestige, status) and rent-capture.  
In capitalism, the commanding height of influence is wielded by owners of the critical factors of 
production, regarded in IEIR as entrepreneurship and credit, with the owners/controllers of credit -- the 
lifeblood of capitalism -- being in the #1 position (per an earlier Commons’ quote). This effect in labor 
markets is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 3 by the difference between the solid and dashed supply 
curves. With a truly neutral government, economic and technological factors create a ‘natural’ dual 
economy and inequality of bargaining power in labor markets, illustrated by the solid supply curves. Self-
interest and the profit/rent motive, however, drive people to invest resources in manipulating government 
to change the rules to promote one-sided competition in their favor.  
On balance, the people at the top end of society have the greatest resources and access in the political 
influence game and, furthermore, the most to gain from government officials and most to return as quid 
pro quo. The extent to which money dominates and buys influence, however, varies on a low-to-high 
scale across countries and over time. The US, for example, moved higher on the scale with the Supreme 
Court decision in Citizens United (2010) that allows individuals, organizations, and corporations to make 
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unlimited election expenditures, in effect creating an electoral market to buy votes, laws, and judicial 
appointments. The IEIR prediction, therefore, is that absent countervailing institutional correction the 
owners of important companies, banks, and high-value human/social capital gradually gain more power to 
influence government and use it to re-structure markets so they capture more rent and shift costs on to 
weaker groups (Stiglitz 2012; Reich 2012). The effect is to amplify dualism and inequality of power, such 
as depicted by the solid and dashed supply curves in the labor market diagram.  
The way this process works is illustrated in the diagram for the labor market. Rules favorable to society’s 
high-end groups shift downward the competitive-external sector labor supply curve from solid LSC1 to 
dashed LSC2 (e.g., open immigration, employment-at-will) and shift upward the primary-internal labor 
supply curve from solid LSM1 to dashed LSM2 (e.g., rationed professional school enrollments, reduction in 
income tax rates – if income effect dominates substitution effect as is general for adult men). In this case, 
the natural inequality of bargaining power is amplified by political reengineering of the institutional 
order, reducing wages and conditions and the share of social surplus going to the middle-bottom of the 
workforce and increasing wages, conditions, profits, and surplus share for the top strata of households.  
Realistically, the polity is segmented into multiple interest groups and, indeed, this is the IEIR pluralistic 
vision of society and economy. But, for sake of argument, assume the polity is divided into a dualistic 
upper class and middle-lower class. The upper class, if cognizant of its group interests and able to 
organize for collective action, optimizes its share of the surplus by setting the rules of the game to yield 
the dashed labor supply curve LSC2 for the lower class. This supply curve yields the ‘break-even’ wage 
WS, also known as the subsistence, sustainable, or living wage. At this wage, the workers in the middle-
lower class segment get just enough income each year to sustain themselves for a lifetime of work and 
production while all the discretionary surplus goes to the upper strata (Hobson 1909; Kaufman and Gall 
2015). In orthodox economics, the ‘surplus-skimming’ nature of this outcome is hidden because all 
earnings – no matter how high due to socially structured supply curves -- are portrayed as a marginal 
product payment for individual contribution to production.   
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Inequality in the 1920s and Origin of Crisis in the 1930s: Model in Action 
  The next step is to use the IEIR model in Figure 3 to explain the economic events of the 1920s and 
1930s as Douglas, Slichter and others interpreted them. Douglas (1935a), in particular, cites considerable 
empirical evidence to support the causal mechanisms and explanatory track record of his model. Key 
empirical features he cites for 1923 to 1929 are: productivity ↑22%; money wages ↑ 8%; unit labor cost ↓ 
14%; all-commodity price index ↓ 6% (price declines centered in agriculture and competitive industries, 
prices in many manufacturing industries roughly constant); total employment ↑ but manufacturing 
employment constant and manufacturing unemployment ↑; consumer goods output ↑ 31% and capital 
goods output ↑ 70%; real wages ↑12% and profits ↑84%; and stock market prices ↑ 177%.   
The orthodox account of the Great Depression typically starts in 1929 because it assumes external events 
– restrictive Federal Reserve monetary policy, supplemented by the stock market crash and Smoot-
Hawley tariff bill – were the principal source of the negative demand/supply shock. The IEIR account, 
partly because it is a dynamic/evolutionary theory, starts instead at the beginning of the 1920s boom and 
highlights the development of growing income inequality, wage stagnation and dual sector imbalances as 
an endogenous cause of the stock market crash and Federal Reserve’s restrictive action. This account, 
mainstream in the pluralistic economics of the 1930s, is now in the heterodox netherworld, per Palley’s 
(2012) observation that the institutionalist/post-Keynesian perspective “has no representation in major 
research universities” (p. 22). For purposes of clear exposition, the causal chain of events and linkages is 
broken into discrete segments.  
Initial Impulse 
   Institutional business cycle theories have a two-part framework: initial impulse and dynamic 
propagation mechanism (Mitchell 1927; Clark 1934; Douglas 1935a). The impulse may be exogenous, 
such as a war or drought. Capitalism, however, also has an endogenous impulse mechanism. The driver of 
capitalism is profit and innovation (not prices and demand/supply) and short and long run cycles come 
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from entrepreneurs’ forward-looking profit expectations and their success at discovering new profit 
opportunities through devices such as new products, improved production technology, and lower cost 
labor (Commons 1934b: Ch. 9; Slichter 1934; Schumpeter 1939).  
In 1920-21, the American economy was in a deep post-war depression; starting in 1922 (the base year 
depicted in Figure 3) it entered a recovery-boom phase. The principle impulse was profit-driven 
development à la Schumpeter of new goods, such as automobiles and radios, and accompanying mass 
production technology and growth in business size. For simplicity of exposition, treat these new 
innovations as a one-time improvement in the economy’s production technology. So viewed, the 
innovation-technology impulse shifts the long run supply curve in Figure 3 to the right from LAS22 to 
LAS29. The economy can produce higher output with the same labor input, contributing to large 
productivity growth. 
Initial Product Market Position  
  A feature of orthodoxy is that its core assumptions are so natural and taken for granted no one questions 
them or even takes notice. An example is the ubiquitous practice of starting a model at the DS 
equilibrium, such as in Figure 1 where AD22-29 = LAS22 (point A). [Realistically, the aggregate demand 
curve shifts rightward throughout the 1920s; here it is kept in one position and labelled AD22-29 to allow 
clear exposition of the presumed flexible price correcting mechanism in conventional theory.] This 
assumption presupposes the economy is competitive, at full employment, and resources are efficiently 
allocated per the first welfare theorem.  
A reason IEIR is considered heterodox is because it assumes, in line with a century of empirical evidence, 
a market economy’s normal position is significantly inside the production possibility frontier (LAS curve) 
with underutilized labor resources and plant capacity. This proposition has large ramifications for welfare 
analysis. That is, if IR institutions, such as unions and minimum wages, are introduced into an optimally 
adjusted economy on the LAS, they naturally create price distortions, resource misallocation, and a 
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negative welfare verdict. If free market capitalism, however, typically operates well within the production 
possibility frontier, the possible efficiency loss from IR institutions may be considerably outweighed by 
dynamic efficiency gains if they help move the economy closer to LAS, or keep it from diverging further.   
Not only did the 1920s expansion start considerably inside the LAS, a substantial output gap remained in 
every year through 1929 (Slichter 1931, chart on p. 6). An explanation is the dual character of the product 
market with a core of large firms having some monopoly-like power over price. The initial price level is 
not competitive P22C, therefore, but monopolistic-inflated P22M, putting the economy at point C on AD22-29.  
Initial Labor Market Position  
  The demand for labor is derived from the demand for goods; thus if output is Q22M in panel (a) of Figure 
3, it gives rise to a labor demand curve in panel (b), such as LD22 (a composite of primary and secondary 
labor demand). Since the legal regime for labor is laissez-faire, common labor has no social safety net and 
therefore a low reservation wage. Also, monopoly in the product market and monopsony in the labor 
market and banker-friendly zero inflation central bank monetary policy constrict employment below the 
competitive full employment level, further lowering common labor’s reservation wage. The supply curve 
for the competitive-secondary sector, therefore, is the dashed supply curve LSC2 and the wage is the 
family subsistence ‘break-even’ level WS (point O).  
At this wage some secondary labor remains unemployed (point O to the kink point) in a form of 
Keynesian less-than-full employment equilibrium. (With a rigid administered price, bidding down the 
wage increases firms’ profits but not short-run sales, production, or employment.) For reasons earlier 
explained, the labor supply curve for the monopsony-internal sector is dashed line LSM2 with high wage 
(point R) and rent component in income.  
AD/AS Growth over the 1920s and the Demand Challenge  
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  The innovation-technology shock shifts LAS22 to LAS29.  The economy’s capacity to produce increases 
from a combination of better technology, capital investment, and labor force growth. In the exposition, 
labor force growth is mostly abstracted. The supply side expansion is also accompanied by an increase in 
aggregate demand (not depicted) as firms ramp-up investment spending (I) in order to build the new 
capacity (∆I → ∆K →∆LAS). AD also increases because ∆income → ∆consumption (C).  
Starting early in the 1920s, therefore, the economy starts on an investment-led business cycle up-phase as 
AD22-29 shifts rightward (not depicted). After several years, the new investment spending opportunities are 
exploited, capital spending falls back to the original I, the AD curve returns to its original 1922 position. 
(I am simplifying for ease of exposition; actually, institutionalist J.M. Clark invented the investment 
accelerator idea (I = k∆GDP, where k is a constant  > 0) which amplifies and endogenizes the cyclical 
swing in investment.) The economy, however, now has more capital stock from the ∆I and higher supply 
capacity. The possibility exists, therefore, for an AD < AS imbalance as the investment burst on the 
demand side fades while production ability is larger on the supply side. Here arises a key challenge for the 
capitalist economy. That is, capitalism is superior to all other known systems for generating innovation, 
new technology, new capital investment, and supply-side growth potential but can it also successfully 
create the additional income, purchasing power and spending on the demand side to take off the market at 
cost-recovering prices the larger supply? Alternatively framed, the expansion of supply is represented by 
the productivity increase (Q29-Q22M)/L and the economy must generate sufficient extra income to purchase 
the higher output per person lest AD < AS threaten over-production and downturn.  
Growth in Inequality and Wage-Productivity Imbalance  
  In the orthodox model, competitive market forces create enough new income, purchasing power and 
spending to maintain AD = AS balance. Here is located the heart of the self-correcting mechanism 
embodied in Say’s Law and invisible hand theorem. The new income comes from two sources.  
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The first, assuming for the moment the product market is competitive, is the fall in the price level from 
P22C to P29C caused by the expansion of product supply. As long as supply exceeds demand (to the left of 
LAS29), prices fall and quantity demanded increases – a movement down AD22-29 from point A to B -- 
until a new AD/AS equilibrium is restored on LAS29. The fall in the price level creates part of the extra 
purchasing power required to buy the Q29-Q22C output by increasing the real income of households.  
The second source of new purchasing power is the rise in factor prices, particularly a rise in the nominal 
wage of labor. The orthodox labor market model is the standard DS diagram and the increase in spending 
and output shifts the aggregate labor demand curve up a rising labor supply curve, leading to a higher 
equilibrium wage and wage bill (W x L). The real wage, therefore, rises from a combination of P↓ and 
W↑ and grows in line with productivity and provides the extra income to keep AD in balance with AS. 
The dynamics in the IEIR model are considerably different. The overall price level remains constant at 
P22M -- a combination of constant-to-rising administered-monopoly prices in the core industrial sector and 
falling prices in the competitive sector (per empirical events). In the labor market, the demand curve 
during the investment-led boom shifts rightward from LD22 to LD29. Money wages in the 
competitive/secondary sector (large in terms of relative employment) remain constant with the horizontal 
labor supply curve LSC2. Money wages in high-end skilled/managerial-professional labor markets rise as 
demand shifts along the upward sloped supply curve LSM2. Combined, growth in real income for the large 
majority of households is anemic due to a combination of stable aggregate price level and small relative 
increase in the money wage.  
Both functional and personal income distributions also become more unequal from 1922 to 1929. The 
personal distribution widens since the wage for competitive-external labor remains the same but the wage 
rises for primary-internal labor (points R vs. M for 1922, S vs. U for 1929). An important factor keeping 
the competitive sector wage constant at WS is that the overall increase in labor demand masks shrinking 
manufacturing sector employment due to capital-labor substitution and technological displacement. A 
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result is greater technological unemployment (Slichter 1934) and downward pressure on sector-specific 
wages. The functional distribution likewise widens over the decade as profits surge and labor income only 
moderately grows -- a combination of mostly elastic labor supply and relatively inelastic labor demand 
(amplified by monopoly pricing).  
The distributional shift to profits and high-income households encourages a rise in the saving/income 
ratio. Higher saving, in conventional theory, induces a fall in the interest rate and spurs more capital 
investment which expands spending, creates more jobs and income, and keeps AD shifting rightward in 
line with LAS. In the same spirit as modern supply side economic doctrine, Secretary of the Treasury 
Andrew Mellon (coincidentally, the third largest tax payer in the nation, behind Rockefeller and Ford) led 
through Congress a series of large reductions in income tax rates -- from a top marginal rate of 73% in 
1922 to 24% in 1929 – in order to further promote saving and investment.  
The AD-AS situation looks more threatening to the IEIR economists of this period. Greater income 
inequality spurs profit and saving which encourages greater capital investment and LAS expansion, 
greater consumption spending by high-income households on luxury goods and services, and booms in 
real estate and stock markets. At the same time, growing inequality restricts wage and income growth of 
middle/lower class families and broad-based consumption spending on the goods from mass production 
industry (where scale economies mean larger volume leads to lower unit costs and lower prices, assuming 
competition), and higher real wages. The industry composition of demand/supply twists, therefore, with 
much of the capacity expansion in mass production industries (automobiles the exemplar in the 1920s) 
while consumption spending shifts to luxury, service, finance, and craft-work industries.  
Industry imbalance and overall tendency to AD < AS are masked in the short-term, however, by stimulus 
to middle class consumption from two balance sheet items. The first is rising asset values from booming 
stock and real estate markets, the second is rising debt from credit-financed purchases. (Retail installment 
payment plans and residential long-term mortgages were innovations of the 1920s). On the other hand, 
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the boom was not further amplified and prolonged in the 1920s by another form of debt stimulus -- deficit 
spending by government (balanced budgets under Republicans Coolidge and Hoover).  
The Government’s No-Win Position  
  Orthodox economists (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Prescott 1999; Parker 2007; Ohanian 2009) 
claim the onset and worsening of the depression was largely the fault of government intervention and 
misguided policies. From the IEIR perspective, the contradictions of American capitalism in the 1920s 
put the government in a no-win situation and the real blame rests on inherent structural imbalances, 
income-wealth inequalities, and wage-price anomalies which short-circuited the system’s (presumed) 
self-correcting mechanism and drove it to an unsupportable AD < AS position.  
Orthodox proponents point one finger of blame at the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed). If the Fed had let the 
money supply grow at a steady but non-inflationary rate, instability in AD could have been avoided (per 
the monetarist assumption of stable velocity in the quantity theory MV=PQ). This idea conflicts with the 
fact, however, that in the 1920s the Fed faced three incommensurable tasks. First, because the USA was 
on the gold standard, the Fed had to keep interest rates high enough to prevent significant gold outflow 
(Eichengreen 1992). But, second, with developing AD < AS imbalance from lagging C, the Fed needed to 
lower interest rates to prop-up spending (even if poorly targeted at capacity-expanding I) – particularly 
since flexible prices were not automatically getting the job done. Yet, third, the Fed needed to raise 
interest rates to cool down the speculative bubbles from high savings flowing into asset markets. The Fed 
chose to raise interest rates to rein in the asset bubbles and protect the nation’s gold stock, thus further 
weakening AD until the imbalance tipping point came in late 1929 (Clark 1934; Slichter 1934).  
The second orthodox finger of blame is pointed at government because President Hoover in late 1929 
jawboned CEOs in the industrial core to maintain wage rates in order to support household purchasing 
power (Ohanian 2009). Critics charge the economically rational policy, given development of LD < LS in 
labor markets after the stock market crash, is to jawbone the CEOs to quickly lower wages so labor 
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becomes cheaper to employers, job hiring resumes, and increased payrolls stimulate more consumption 
spending and a rebound of AD (Rothbard 2000). Both institutional economists and business leaders 
understood this logic but argued what may be true for an individual commodity market is not true for a 
national industrial economy (Keynes’ fallacy of composition argument). Aggregate-level wage cuts, for 
example, also cut household income and spending, for as Henry Ford observed, “If you cut wages, you 
just cut the number of your own customers. If an employer does not share prosperity with those who 
made him prosperous, then pretty soon there will be no prosperity to share” (Ford and Crowther 1926: 
154). Cutting wages is also self-defeating because, as another employer observed, “the result is the 
worker’s feeling that he has been treated unfairly – which makes him sufficiently inefficient to undo the 
possible savings on the cost of production” (Johnson 1921: 681).  
Thus, the neoclassical critics of Hoover err because macro-level wage cuts have not only a (potentially) 
positive effect on employment but also a negative effect, and the negative effect likely dominates 
(Slichter 1934: 114-24). The positive effect is on the production side where a fall in the wage W makes 
labor cheaper, induces hiring, lowers production cost, facilitates a fall in product price P, which increases 
product demand – illustrated by the downward movement on AD22-29 from point A to B. The two-part 
negative effect is, first, that the drop in work effort and productivity may more than offset the fall in 
production cost from a lower wage and, second, a lower wage reduces the aggregate wage bill and 
household income (given an inelastic labor demand curve – surely the case in a developing slump), and 
leads to further cut-back on consumption spending. The negative spending effect is illustrated in panel (a) 
by leftward shifts of the AD curve from AD22 → AD30 → dashed line AD32. Falling wages, therefore, do 
not lead to self-correction and full employment but to a ‘dog chasing its tail’ syndrome of wage/price 
deflation and cumulative downward spiral in spending and production -- illustrated by the dynamic path 
A to E and then not to G but along the curved arrow to H on the lower demand curve. By jawboning 
CEOs to maintain money wages, Hoover was choosing the much smaller of two evils – making some 
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production and employment uneconomic because of wage maintenance rather than to lower wages and 
risk a deflationary spending collapse. 
Disequilibrium Dynamics and Collapse into Depression 
  An IEIR criticism of orthodox theory is that it makes comparative static predictions without examining 
the dynamic aspects of the adjustment process that connect the ‘before’ and ‘after’ equilibriums. The 
story just told of the movement of the economy from 1922 to 1929 and the development of AD/AS 
disequilibrium maladjustment is a case in point; another case in point is the movement of the economy 
from late 1929 to early 1933 when falling prices and wages led not to restoration of full employment (per 
Hayek 1933; Robbins 1934) but a deflationary downward spiral that threatened complete collapse 
(Commons 1934a; Keynes 1936).  
As empirical context for this section (Douglas 1935a; Wolman 1933), note that from 1929-1933 the all-
commodity price level ↓ 36%; money wages ↓ 23%; productivity ↑ 21%; employee hours ↓ 53%; and unit 
labor cost ↓ 36%. These patterns hide, however, a marked dichotomy as prices and wages quickly started 
to fall after the1929 crash in firms in competitive product markets but only began to slowly decline in the 
last half of 1931 in firms in oligopolistic and regulated product markets. Average weekly earnings fell 
45% in bituminous coal, for example, but only 3% in utilities.  
The automatic recovery process of conventional theory, as portrayed in most principles texts (e.g., 
Krugman and Wells 2015), is illustrated in panel (a). The stock market shock shifts AD 22-29 left to AD30; 
at the prevailing price level (assume for exposition P22C) output falls from point A to point E; but in 
response to excess supply the price level falls and the economy moves down the AD30 curve until full 
employment equilibrium is gained on the LAS (e.g., point G on LAS22 and on to point J on LAS29). A 
recession (A to E) is unavoidable but is modest and short-lived – if wages and prices are flexible and 
quickly drop like in the coal industry.  
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Institutionalists contend this scenario is fatally flawed. Economists in the mainstream-New Keynesian 
tradition, for example, accept the validity of the self-correcting story in a competitive/first-welfare 
theorem world but argue in practice it works slowly due to various behavioral and institutional frictions 
and rigidities (Krugman and Wells 2015). The message, however, is orthodox – the fault is not with the 
competitive market model – it remains the ideal -- but the imperfect people, institutions, and governments 
in it. IEIR crosses into heterodox territory because it holds the self-correcting/invisible hand story is false 
in theory and unworkable in practice.  
The orthodox story for labor markets seems falsified right from the start. Dunlop (1944) provides 
evidence it was not the pressure of excess labor supply (unemployment) and worker under-bidding, as 
pictured in the DS model of labor markets, that explains the decision of firms to cut wages but, rather, the 
differential pressure on their profit margins from falling prices in competitive vs. non-competitive product 
markets. Thus, the causal link explaining the timing and severity of wage cutting is found in the 
institutional structure of product markets and pressure on profit margins, not in D < S forces of 
disequilibrium in labor markets and length of the queue of jobseekers (Commons 1934a: 526-53).  
The standard model also ignores numerous disequilibrating sources of positive feedback (Clark 1934; 
Douglas 1935a). The invisible hand story depends on negative feedback; that is, if AD < AS then prices 
fall and AD increases. The IEIR economists identified downwardly rigid industrial prices as the major 
culprit for the failure of productivity gains to be distributed back as purchasing power to households 
(Douglas 1935a: 77); hence, the fault for the depression was not that labor had too high wages but 
capitalists had too high prices (Moulton 1935). The equilibrium-maintaining solution is for prices to 
steadily but very gradually come down over the entire 1920s so firms have opportunity to find offsetting 
productivity gains and cost reductions in order to maintain profit margins and production levels. The 
actual pattern, however, was relatively rigid industrial prices through the 1920s and then, after two-three 
years of AD decline, emergence of relatively large and snowballing price cuts in oligopolistic industrial 
sectors. Done this way, price cuts are likely to turn destabilizing (Slichter 1934). For example, firms 
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cutback supply chain orders to reduce inventory stocks to protect profit margins (with deflation, 
inventories bring a capital loss) and, also, because demanders hold back purchases to wait for further 
price declines.  
Wage cuts are also destabilizing, contra orthodox theory. One reason has already been given: the fall in W 
lowers AD and cuts sales and production. A second (Keynes 1936: Ch. 2) is that as W falls so does P 
which leaves the real wage in the labor market unchanged (in DS theory it needs to fall). Actually, 
between 1930-33 wages fell by approximately one-fourth but firms, now with lower production cost, 
followed by cutting prices by about one-third so the net effect was a perverse (viz. neoclassical theory) 
increase in real wages. Dunlop (1938) found this counter-cyclical movement in real wages to be the 
general case. Here is another dog-chasing-tail story and, also, prime illustration of why individual action 
in markets can fail and collective government action is needed. However, Douglas (1935a) also points out 
that while the real wage went up it is nonetheless incorrect for orthodox economists to blame the 
depression on too-high wages (or rigid wages) since with productivity growth over 1929-1932 the real 
unit cost of labor significantly declined.   
Another destabilizing positive feedback channel important to the depression story is that the nation’s 
credit supply also contains an endogenous pro-cyclical component. Even if the Federal Reserve keeps the 
money supply growing at a constant rate, total credit availability expands and contracts to accentuate 
booms and contractions as banks drawn down excess reserves to make loans on upswings but call in loans 
and build-up excess reserves in downswings (reflected in swings in velocity V).   
Very important to the IEIR model is the positive feedback effect caused by fixed survival costs of 
families and firms (Webb and Webb 1897; Clark 1923; Kaufman 2010b; Stabile 2016). During a slump, 
as revenues and income fall, firms and families become increasingly squeezed by ongoing fixed cost 
obligations, such as minimum food, health, and housing for workers (the wage WS). If fixed costs are 
large and marginal costs small, their response to P↓W↓ is to increase supply – by firms (e.g., farmers) to 
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avoid bankruptcy and by families to avoid homelessness and destitution. Product and labor supply curves, 
therefore, have an asymmetric shape, as illustrated for the labor market by the kink at point O on LSC2 
where below WS the labor supply curve (dashed line segment LSC2*, following the arrow) rotates to a 
negative slope. In this region, the self-correcting mechanism goes in reverse because falling prices and 
wages induce more supply on already glutted markets. For example, as wage income reaches WS, 
employees work harder to keep their jobs, offer to work longer hours or take multiple jobs, and wives, 
children, retired, and students enter the labor force (the added-worker effect). Theoretically, at the 
subsistence income level, the labor supply curve turns unit elastic -- per a target income model of labor 
supply (Altman 2012) -- and the demand-supply situation in the labor market becomes dynamically 
unstable. (Neoclassical theory, in contrast, assumes as W↓ employees cut back work hours, or quit their 
jobs, for more leisure or job search, moving the economy down a forward-sloped LS.) 
In sum, the IEIR perspective is that a contributing cause of the Great Depression was failure of the market 
system to keep purchasing power growing in line with capacity expansion through a combination of 
declining product prices and rising money and real wages. Then, once the depression started, the market 
system exacerbated the shortfall of purchasing power by unleashing a downward spiral of price and wage 
cuts which simultaneously caused firms to further cut back production and employment and households 
to further retrench on spending. When implosion of the over-leveraged and under-regulated financial 
sector is added to the mix, the idea that the price system’s self-correcting mechanism is going to 
automatically stop the descent and trigger recovery -- if only government gets out of the way -- appeared 
to DCS as wagering the very existing of American capitalism and representative democracy on an 
academic theory of competitive market capitalism that only slightly resembles the real world. Thus, from 
the conservative/libertarian perspective, Commons, Keynes, and Roosevelt were left-wing collectivists 
leading the nation down the road to socialism and serfdom (Hayek 1944); from the IEIR/progressive 
perspective they were pragmatic reformers saving capitalism from market and moral collapse and 
protecting representative democracy from the social disorder that opened the door to right-wing fascist 
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take-overs in Germany, Italy, and Spain (Commons 1934a: Ch. 11, “Communism, Fascism, Capitalism;” 
also Wapshott 2011).  
Policy Response: Inequality and Crisis in the 1930s and Today  
  To close the paper, this section briefly considers the policy implications of the IEIR model with respect 
to solving the inequality/cone problem and incipient tendency for AD failure. The policy strategy adopted 
by Roosevelt’s New Deal is considered first and then lessons are applied to America’s income inequality 
problem of the 2010s. However, as Commons (1934a: 877) notes, “economic theory must be based on 
history, as well as equilibrium,” and the same applies to policy implications from a theory.  
In particular, the American economy is in a far different situation in the 2010s than when CDS wrote in 
the 1920s-1930s. At that time the United States was the rising economic and political power in the world 
but, today, China occupies that position and the U.S. plays the role of Britain after World War I. Britain 
of the early 20th century, like the U.S. of the early 21st century, was the declining world power suffering 
from imperial overreach, high inequality with anemic economic growth, shift from international creditor 
to debtor status, marked deterioration in government and private sector balance sheets, and a hollowing 
out of manufacturing from an overvalued currency and loss of international competitiveness.  
New Deal Policy for Restoring Shared Prosperity  
  Conceptually, the productivity-wage cone in Figure 1 can be narrowed either by lowering the 
productivity growth line or raising the (median) growth line of real wages. The latter, in turn, can be 
accomplished by lowering consumer prices or raising money wages or other forms of labor compensation.  
Lowering productivity growth makes everyone poorer and is a non-starter option. From an IEIR 
perspective, increasing real wages through deflation of the price level is also likely to make everyone 
poorer from recession, for reasons described. The remaining option to narrow the cone is increase in the 
growth rate of money wages (broadly defined). Money wages, in turn, can be pulled up by market forces 
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or pushed up by institutional forces. Commons indicates the IEIR preference is to rely where possible on 
market-pull but willingness to use institutional-push as either complement or substitute. He states on this 
matter (Commons 1934a: 875),   
If the profit-motive, in the field of economics, can be enlisted in the program of social welfare, 
then a dynamic factor, more constructive than all the others, is enlisted. It is an appeal to the 
businessman to get rich by making others rich, and, if he does not respond, then to appeal to 
collective action. 
Upward market pull on wages comes from stronger AD which shifts product and labor demand curves 
rightward enough to soak up the unemployed so firms voluntarily raise wages to retain current employees 
and recruit new employees. Upward institutional push on wages, on the other hand, comes from IR policy 
actions, such as higher/expanded minimum wages, union bargaining coverage, and social safety net 
programs, that shift upward firms’ cost curves and the economy’s short-run AS curve (not shown in 
Figure 3). Both AD and IR policy instruments raise wages and narrow the cone but the former, ceteris 
paribus, is preferable because it expands profits and employment while the latter tends to squeeze profits 
and reduce employment. However, in the 1930s CDS concluded that a successful AD expansion program 
also requires a synergistic complement of expanded IR and social welfare initiatives (Slichter 1936: 211).       
CDS applauded Roosevelt for refusing to wait for automatic recovery and switching to methods of 
managed recovery (Commons 1934a: 887-900; Douglas 1935a: 95). As the New Deal unfolded, they 
nonetheless concluded the package of programs was in some ways counter-productive and in other ways 
inadequate. Core parts of the New Deal IR program were a mandated minimum wage, unemployment and 
old age insurance programs, and expanded collective bargaining. Each of these measures raises wages, 
expands non-wage compensation, creates wage floors, and increases labor’s power in wage 
determination. From an IEIR perspective, these actions are desirable because they help stop deflation, 
more fully cover social costs of labor, end exploitation (with large unemployment, real wages are often 
below marginal product), create stronger automatic stabilizers, reduce inequality in the personal earnings 
distribution, and shift national income from capital to labor. They also have positive effects on 
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productivity (Altman 2012), such as reduced turnover, an efficiency wage effect and fewer work 
stoppages, and higher wages not only raise production cost but also consumer spending.   
However, just as CDS were skeptical of the efficacy of wage cutting to bring about recovery, so too were 
they skeptical that the reverse strategy of wage raising would by itself be successful (Slichter 1934: 30; 
Douglas 1935a: 223-29).  From their perspective, the structural rebalancing of bargaining power and 
creation of a social safety net for workers is needed to reduce problems of inequality and wage stagnation 
but has to be complemented by an even stronger program of monetary/fiscal stimulus so that the 
expansion of production and employment from a rightward shift in the AD curve more than offsets the 
contractionary effect from the cost-induced upward shift in the economy’s AS curve (including higher 
taxes on businesses and households for social insurance contributions).  
Since the economy was so far below potential output in 1933-1935, CDS (Douglas 1935a: 137) thought 
inflation effects would be minimal, particularly since firms would be able to offset the cost push effect of 
higher labor cost with cost economies from increased volume. The need to expand AD was heightened by 
other aspects of the New Deal program which CDS supported as part of the structural attack on 
unbalanced income distribution. An example is reversing the income tax cuts of the 1920s to restore much 
greater progressivity in marginal rates. However, the higher income tax payments cause a leakage from 
AD that needs to be offset by other short-run spending injections. With regard to longer-term saving, 
investment, and labor supply decisions, on the other hand, the higher income tax rates are largely non-
distortionary because much of top-end income takes the form of economic rent.  
Another reason for AD expansion is that a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA, 1933) 
encouraged monopoly pricing in product markets which acted as a negative shock undermining AD and 
employment expansion (Douglas 1935a: 324-50). The NIRA’s cartelization of product markets, and 
Agricultural Adjustment Act’s curtailment of crop and livestock production, were strongly opposed by 
CDS as counterproductive monopolistic restrictions. This position, at first glance, appears contradictory 
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with their support of greater unionism and legal regulation in labor markets. However, given CDS’s 
diagnosis that structural monopoly kept prices too high and rigid in product markets while structural 
inequality of bargaining power kept wages too low in labor markets, their position is consistent. 
(Institutionalist Gardner Means made this idea well-known in the 1930s with his theory of administered 
prices; see Lee and Samuels (1992). The monopoly part of the NIRA was pushed by a diverse coalition 
favoring business planning, industrial self-government, and European-type corporatism and social 
democracy (e.g., Gerard Swope of General Electric, Veblenian Rexford Tugwell, and Senator Richard 
Wagner).  
From the perspective of CDS (Slichter 1936: 209), the most important shortcoming in the New Deal 
program was failure to inject enough additional purchasing power so AD expands sufficiently to not only 
absorb the policy-induced increase in labor cost (and prices) but also promote strong economic recovery 
with expanding production, employment, and renewed capital investment. By 1933 the economy had 
tremendous excess production capacity and, also, little room for interest rates to further drop, so 
expansionary monetary policy was largely sidelined (Douglas 1935a: 117). Likewise, other countries 
were too much in depression for the devaluation of the dollar in 1933 to have much stimulus effect on 
exports. The only potent policy instrument left was government deficit spending but Roosevelt was 
philosophically committed to balanced budgets (Barber 1985). Thus, despite the much publicized New 
Deal public works programs (e.g., Works Project Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps), the 
actual size of deficit spending relative to the huge shortfall in AD was small and inadequate. Without 
enough offsetting Keynesian-type AD stimulus, the cost-raising IR structural reform part of the New Deal 
exerted a restrictive effect on recovery during the 1930s.  It unfortunately took World War II to boost 
government spending enough to restore full employment. Then, after the war, the nation experienced a 
thirty year IEIR/Keynesian golden era with strong growth, much-reduced inequality, real wages 
advancing with productivity growth, and small threat of competitive undercutting from foreign rivals.  
Implications for Policy in the 2010s 
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  A worsening wage-productivity cone problem developed in the 1920s, first, because of widening in the 
personal distribution of income caused by a combination of weak wage pull-up from expansionary AD 
forces, declining wage push-up from institutional forces (decade-long drop in union density), and large 
cut in income tax rates for high earners, and, second, because of increase in the capital share of income 
relative to the labor share as strong productivity growth and stagnant wages resulted in booming profits. 
Much the same constellation of forces accounts for the rising cone problem and growth of income 
inequality in the U.S. since the 1970s, but with added features that have considerably prolonged and 
worsened the process and thus portend a much deeper and prolonged correction.  
The cone divergence and income inequality problems worsened in the 1920s because the natural 
endogenous dynamic identified above was amplified by that era’s version of neoliberal, free-market, and 
supply-side economics. The same triplet of policies, interacting with the endogenous inequality dynamic, 
has created a similar cone problem since 1980 (Palley 2012; Reich 2012; Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). 
When President Reagan entered office, the top income tax rate was 70% and when President G.W. Bush 
left office in early 2009 the rate had been cut to 35%. Likewise, the real value of the minimum wage was 
$9.07 when Reagan entered office and fell to $6.94 in Bush’s last year, union density among wage/salary 
workers fell from 23% to 12%, and the proportion of unemployed receiving unemployment insurance fell 
from 38% to 32%. Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office (2015) estimates that actual output fell 
below potential output (a measure of AD deficiency)  in twenty-five years and above potential output in 
eight years between 1980-2013 (mostly in the late 1990s), with cumulated negative gaps more than triple 
the cumulated size of positive gaps. 
Closing the cone requires a similar combination of AD wage pull up, institutional wage push up, and 
increase in high-end income tax rate rates as initiated during the 1930s. But, as pointed out above, the 
economic and political situation facing the U.S. in the 2010s is quite different. Consideration of these 
contextual factors points to the sobering conclusion that no New Deal-type package of reforms can solve 
the cone/inequality problem in the 2010s without high risk of tipping the U.S. economy into the next 
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recession/depression. But, at the same time, if the cone problem is not addressed the accumulating 
imbalances will also likely precipitate a future recession/depression. The U.S. economy has entered, 
therefore, what appears to be the no-win end phase of the current wage-stagnation/credit cycle where the 
structural imbalances have deteriorated to the point the next major downturn, absent an offsetting boost to 
demand/supply (e.g., a new technology or product innovation), appears locked-in and a matter of time.  
As described earlier, closing the productivity-wage cone requires on the institutional side some 
combination of higher minimum wage, expanded social safety net programs, and larger union density, 
along with restoration of higher marginal income tax rates (and inheritance taxes) on top-end households. 
These actions, on balance, raise cost and reduce profit margins for firms and need to be offset by 
expanded AD. In the 1930s, expansionary monetary policy could not generate the needed stimulus but 
expansionary deficit spending could because the government’s balance sheet was in excellent condition 
from a prior decade of budget surpluses. Likewise, the U.S. did not need to worry about a large leakage of 
demand into extra imports or appreciation of the dollar in the 1930s because international trade was a 
small part of total GDP and FDR had devalued the dollar and taken the country off the gold standard.  
In the 2010s, on the other hand, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have been pushed to their 
limits to stop the 2008-2009 crisis and restore modest growth while an overvalued dollar and mercantilist 
trade policies of China and other countries cause American AD stimulus to have a weak effect on 
domestic production because a significant portion of extra consumption spending and corporate profits 
leak out as commodity imports, foreign direct investment, and financial market asset speculation. With 
monetary and fiscal policies in the U.S. largely tapped-out (e.g., key interests rates have been kept 
extraordinarily low by massive quantitative easing of the money supply while fiscal deficits have been so 
large the national debt has doubled in the last decade), a massive accumulated international debt position 
from three decades of budget and trade deficits, emergence of new bubble tendencies in financial and real 
estate markets, and slowing growth in Asia and weak performance in Europe, the American economy is 
particularly susceptible to downturn from any cutback initiated by falling profit expectations from AD < 
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AS. The trigger for the next crisis, therefore, is likely some negative AD/AS shock, much like the stock 
market crash of late 1929, with the combination of factors cited above – including the long-term 
hollowing out of middle-lower class spending power from three decades of rising inequality, stagnating 
wages, and export of goods-producing jobs -- leading to deeper cumulative collapse, as in 1930-1932. The 
hugely troubling difference between then and now is that the American government in the 2010s is in a 
far weaker position to rescue the system as ‘spender of last resort.’   
The role of labor unions, mentioned but not discussed to this point, is important but also contradictory. As 
a general principle, CDS supported laws protecting workers rights to join unions and collective 
bargaining, partly for democratic workforce governance but also to reduce inequality of bargaining power 
in labor markets (Commons 1934a: 588; Douglas: 1935a: 212; Kaufman 2007). However, in the 1920s 
they became disillusioned with a large part of the American labor movement due to its outmoded craft 
union structure, sclerotic leadership, and oppositional stance to unitarist ‘goodwill’ employment programs 
(Leiserson 1929; Slichter 1929). CDS therefore shifted priority to solving the cone problem with the 
triplet of management-led welfare capitalism (with high-commitment wages, job security, and gain-
sharing), creating and pushing up wage floors and social safety nets with labor law and social insurance; 
and preventing destructive business cycles and unemployment with macroeconomic stabilization 
programs (Draper, Commons, Lescohier, and Lewisohn 1925; Commons 1927; Whalen 1993; Kaufman 
2003). Further, CDS concluded labor unions typically pinch profit margins more than labor laws and 
social insurance programs and for this reason are second best. Yet, when the depression developed, the 
welfare capitalist model failed and, to stop wage cutting and then reflate wages and AD, CDS shifted 
back to strong support for unions, per their encouragement of the Wagner Act (Kaufman 2016a). 
Nonetheless, Douglas (1935a) and Slichter (1934) give paradoxically little discussion to unions as 
instruments for narrowing inequality and the productivity-wage cone even though wage policy gets entire 
chapters in their books.  
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After WWII, the combination of Keynesian full employment demand management and strong union 
bargaining power led to a secular increase in union wage premiums, loss of competitiveness in heavily 
unionized industries, and cost-push inflation pressures (Blanchflower and Bryson 2007; Freeman 2007; 
Hirsch 2012). With this record in mind, little doubt exists that a return to a pre-1970 union density rate of 
25%-35% would significantly narrow the productivity-wage cone, per comparison to the cone in other 
countries with higher union density  (BLS 2012: Chart 3:12). On the other hand, one also has to worry 
that the downside for the American economy, in the context of a decentralized and non-coordinated 
bargaining system and substantial trade exposure, would be significant harm to competiveness, jobs, and 
growth performance. Yet, without a strong labor movement, who or what is going to effectively represent 
workers’ interests in the political process so corporations, bankers, and rich don’t use their dominance of 
government to further tilt the rules of the game (tax policy? health care? environment?) toward top-end 
inequality and rent-seeking (Hacker and Pierson 2011)?  Commons (1934a: Ch. 11; 1950) considers the 
trade-offs and alternatives and concludes a strong labor movement is the better social choice because, 
without it, capitalism endogenously drifts toward plutocracy, crisis-producing economic imbalance, 
political conflict and class polarization, and potential for an American form of fascism (the ‘Weimar 
scenario’ in Palley 2012).  
Conclusion 
  Early IEIR writers concluded the #1 cause of poor employment relations a century ago was the 
macroeconomic trilogy of significant reserve army of unemployed, corrosive effect of high and worsening 
income inequality, and destabilizing boom/bust cycles. Recognizing that solving a problem first requires 
understanding and explaining it, they worked out a dynamic disequilibrium model with the employment 
relationship and wage-productivity nexus at the core. Other important parts include the conflicting logics 
of exchange in markets and production in organizations, dualistic market structure of competition and 
monopoly/monopsony; an economic-political nexus with tendency toward elite control by corporations, 
financiers, and large property owners; inequality of bargaining power favoring employers in external and 
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internal labor markets; skewed generation and distribution of economic rents to owners of scarce 
resources and social/political privilege; and secular tendency toward worsening aggregate demand/supply 
imbalance from profit-led investment spending outpacing wage-led consumption spending.  
This model in large part informed Franklin Roosevelt’s diagnosis of the onset and worsening of the Great 
Depression and shaped the New Deal strategy he and IEIR advisors adopted for solving the debacle. 
Indeed, an integrated version of IEIR in labor markets and Keynesianism in product markets, sometimes 
called after the war Social Keynesianism, served as the guiding economic doctrine of American 
governments until the 1980 election of Reagan and triumph of Friedman and Hayek over Keynes and 
Commons (Wapshott 2011; Galbraith 2016).  Not coincidentally, the return of free-market/supply-side 
economics also brought with it the same pre-1930s pattern of growing inequality and divergence of wage 
and productivity growth and eventual collapse in 2008 into crisis and near-depression. Advocates of the 
free market were as surprised by the onset of crisis in 2008 as they were in 1929 and, in response, said as 
little as possible until the storm passed or pointed the finger of blame at government and associated 
liberal/labor interest groups for the traditional sins of obstructing competition, interfering with 
demand/supply and the invisible hand, and enabling distortionary rent-seeking by the usual suspects (e.g., 
Mulligan 2012; Allison 2013).  
A popular adage is that people who do not learn from history are destined to repeat it, and the latest 
bubble of free-market fundamentalism seems an affirmative example. So viewed, the Friedman-Hayek-
Lucas era of the last three decades is only the latest chapter in an orthodox book of Panglossian science 
fiction and utopian individualism. This story, taught in universities around the world, features highly 
imperfect creatures – selfish, aggressive, status-seeking, semi-rational humans – who originally live in a 
Hobbesian world of war, predation, and bare subsistence but, as if by an invisible-hand miracle, are led 
out of darkness simply by following perfect-tending, zero-cost competitive market price signals -- a 
heaven-sent free lunch when all other coordination modes (e.g., firms and management) require expensive 
set-up and operating costs -- to spontaneously trade themselves to a best-of-all-possible worlds of 
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maximum freedom, material goods, and life satisfaction in an idealized form of a global-scale Oriental 
bazaar. This story, built on impressive but equally improbable logic, became the gospel two hundred 
years ago when Ricardo triumphed over Malthus and Sismondi and compelling competitive market logic 
triumphed over compelling empirical facts – starting with the fifteen year post-Napoleonic depression 
(1815-1830) which Ricardo and laissez-faire true-believers blamed on government interference with free 
trade in goods and child labor.  
The specific intent of this paper is to uncover and develop the long-buried and forgotten part of the early 
institutional-industrial relations literature dealing with labor markets, income inequality, and wage-
productivity dynamics.  The broader aim is to provide a paradigm vision in labor economics and general 
economics for a more realistic, relevant, explanatory, and humanistic alternative to the dominant 
neoclassical framework of competitive demand-supply labor markets, automatic self-correcting/invisible-
hand/full-employment equilibrium, and first and second welfare theorems. But, if nothing else, the paper 
at least disproves the long-time caricature that original institutional economics is an empty project of no 
theory or anti-theory (Coase 1998; Boyer and Smith 2001; Kaufman 2017) – although this too could be a 
hollow accomplishment since the two-century orthodox response to heterodox challenge, if not caricature 
and misrepresentation, is avoidance, silence, and the blind eye.    
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Figure 1. Growth of Productivity and Real Wages, United States
 
Source: Bivens and Mishel, 2015.
Source: Osberg, 2014 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  IEIR Model: Events of 1920s-1930s Explained 
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